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Abstract 
This paper investigates the level of price and non-price competition in the Portuguese 
financial system. We study the determinants of market power in banking and discuss the 
role of switching costs. We show that the degree of customer mobility is low and that 
price instruments have a higher impact on market share than non-price instruments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The growing competition within the Portuguese banking sector has been 
characterised by the generalised use of competitive instruments, namely price (interest 
rates and commission) advertising and branches. A consequence of this practice has 
been revealed in a decrease in the margins of banking institutions and a tendency 
towards concentration, the most obvious sign of which is the fact that over 80% of the 
banking sector is controlled by only five financial groups.
2
 
In this context, the study of price and non price competition gains particular 
importance. Deposit interest rates may indicate the significance of saving within the 
economy, and the loan interest rates may function as a boost to investment and 
consumption. Similarly, the amount of advertising expenses provides a clear sign of the 
importance banking institutions give to marketing, while the branch network may give 
an indication of the distribution policy. One of the objectives of this study is precisely to 
assess the level of price and non price competition in the Portuguese banking sector, in 
particular on deposit and lending markets.  
The second aim of this study is to analyse the mobility of deposit and lending 
markets. This analysis is fundamental as it directly affects the capacity of the 
competitive instruments available to banks to influence their market share in any given 
period. Thus this study of mobility will allow the discussion of the relevance of the of 
“switching costs”. 
 The third area of study involves the assessment of the market power exercised 
by banking institutions. In particular, it aims to establish the level of competitiveness 
and/or degree of coordination/collusion of the banking sector, both with respect to the 
deposit and loan interest rates and to advertising and the branch network. 
 Yet a further objective of this study is to measure the impact of the commissions 
banks charge their customers. Bank commissions are increasingly used as a means of 
profiting from the services offered. The use of a fairly wide margin may have an 
influence on the assessment of the competitive element of the market share, on its 
                                               
2 According to data published in the Economic Bulletin from September 2000 from the Bank of Portugal. 
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mobility, on the market power exercised by institutions and even on their competitive 
behaviour.   
Various authors have endeavoured to measure the impact of market structure on 
the banks’ profitability. The most common approach consists in testing the econometric 
relationship between a given index of profitability or the interest rates (deposit and loan) 
and particular market structures or other control variables. At the international level, the 
principal references to this “reduced form” approach, are Berger (1995), Berger and 
Hannan (1989), Evanoff and Fortier (1988), Hannan and Liang (1995), Heggestad 
(1979), Heggestad and Mingo (1976) and Rhoades (1977, 1982). Most of these studies 
are based on the economy of the United States of America and they all reveal an 
important conclusion: the most concentrated local markets are more profitable for 
banking institutions. In Gilbert’s classic work (1984), he presents an important review 
of empiric literature prior to 1984 and in Weiss (1989), this review is even more 
detailed. 
Nevertheless, this “reduced form” approach has since been abandoned and more 
recent studies are founded on structural models based on the theory of industrial 
organisation (“new empirical IO”). Generally speaking, these studies depart from a 
model of oligopoly with a homogenous product in which several hypotheses are 
established, to allow an estimate of some behaviour parameters and/or their relationship 
to the market structure. Examples of this approach are the studies of Berg and Kim 
(1994), Nathan and Neave (1989), Spiller and Favaro (1984) and Shaffer (1989, 1993).  
Some authors, on the other hand, prefer to adopt the hypothesis of product 
distinction, namely Hannan (1991), Hannan and Liang (1993) and Heffernan (1993).  
Amongst these, Hannan’s work (1991) comes to the fore. He presents a theoretical 
corpus which establishes the structure-behaviour-performance of the banking sector
3
. In 
this context, the traditional explicable variables of market power are: the level of 
concentration of the market within a given period and the market share of the institution 
in question, on the assumption that these two variables are positively related to market 
power. The former relates to the inverse relationship that exists between market 
concentration and competitiveness (the greater the concentration, the lower the 
                                               
3 Hannan’s paper (1991) is also a development of the monopoly model from the Klein line (1971) - Monti 
(1972). 
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competitiveness, and therefore, the greater the banks’ capacity to practise prices above 
the marginal cost.) The latter results from the hypothesis that the larger banks  (with a 
larger market share) have to face less elastic demands.  
 The choice between the “reduced from” approach and the “new empirical IO” 
approach is not obvious. Even though the “new empirical IO” approach offers an exact 
specification for the price-concentration relationship, it needs an explicit functional 
form to be imposed for the demand function – explicit, as in Berg and Kim (1994) and 
Shaffer (1993), or implicit, as it assumes the elasticity of constant demand, as in Spiller 
and Favaro (1984). In most cases the “new empirical IO” approach also demands the 
imposition of various hypotheses of symmetry. The researcher is thus faced with a 
dilemma regarding the imposition of the functional form: should it relate to the price-
concentration relationship or the demand function – for more on this discussion see 
Pinho (2000).  
The market power has been assessed through the exclusive analysis of 
competition via price and no price or through the combined analysis of competition via 
price and no price. Among the studies applied to Portugal that only analyse competition 
in interest rates we should mention Lopes (1994), Barros and Leite (1994, 1996), Antão 
(1996), Barros (1999) and Barros and Modesto (1999). 
Regarding the combined analysis of price and no price competition, at the 
international level, Heggestad and Mingo’s study (1976) is a classic reference. Even 
though this dissertation assesses price and no price competition simultaneously, my 
approach differs from that of Heggestad and Mingo (1976). Whereas these authors 
estimated a system of equations in a reduced form, in which the interest rates and some 
proxies of services are used as dependent variables, my approach is based on a 
structural model of banking, which will give rise to optimal conditions of competitive 
instruments.  
In Portugal, the assessment of market power based on the simultaneous analysis 
of price and no price competition has been carried out, above all, by Pinho (2000, 
2001). Customer mobility in the Portuguese banking sector is studied above all by 
Pinho (1995a). He develops a model with dynamic adjustment of market shares for the 
Portuguese deposit market, over the period 1988-1992. One of the principal conclusions 
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of the study lies in the low mobility of market shares, which could reveal the existence 
of some switching costs.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical and 
empiric model and section 3 presents the estimation procedure. Section 4 concludes.  
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2. THE MODEL  
 
2.1. THE THEORETICAL MODEL  
 
This paper aims to study the Portuguese deposit and lending markets. It is 
assumed that banks compete for market share. Thus, the total volume of deposits and 
loans in the economy, referred to as D and L respectively, is assumed as external to the 
banks. In this context D and L depend, essentially, on the economic cycle and the 
decisions on monetary policy conducted by the Bank of Portugal.  
The individual volume of deposits and loans of each bank is, respectively:  
Dsd Dtiti ,,      (2.1) 
Lsl Ltiti ,,      (2.2) 
where Dtis ,  and 
L
tis , represent the market share on deposits and loans from company i in 
the period t, respectively.  
Pinho (1995a) establishes that significant switching costs exist on the Portuguese 
deposit market. The model that allows us to assess the existence of these costs will be a 
model with dynamic adjustment of market shares. According to this model, the market 
share of the deposits of the company in the order i in the period t Dtis ,  depends, 
simultaneously, on the share of the potential market in this same period, taken as *,
D
tis , 
and of the market share of the previous period, taken as Dtis 1, . The variations in the 
market share are affected by a mechanism of partial adjustment. As referred to by Gual 
(1993), the alteration of the competitive position of a bank will only influence the share 
of the potential market, so that a part of the market share will remain unaltered, due to a 
certain inertia of the deposit customers.  
The same reasoning will be developed in relation to loan markets. This model 
will be described by the equation (2.3) on deposit markets and by the equation (2.4) on 
lending markets.  
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The coefficient of partial adjustment  represents the portion of the effective 
market share in the bank, in a given period, which is affected by variations in the share 
of the potential market. This parameter will allow us to assess the degree of mobility of 
market shares, as there is, of course, a positive relationship between the value of the 
parameter and that mobility.   If, for example, the parameter  takes the value of zero, it 
means that the whole of the bank’s market share within a given period depends 
exclusively on its market share in the previous period, and that mobility in the market 
share is non-existent. As the value of  approaches one, so the mobility of the quota of 
the market increases and consequently, the greater is the capacity of alterations in the 
share of the potential market to alter the effective bank share.  
We can rewrite the dynamics of the model as:  
 
D
ti
DD
ti
DD
ti sss 1,
*
,, ln1lnln    (2.5) 
 
 Lti
LL
ti
LL
ti sss 1,
*
,, ln1lnln    (2.6) 
The potential market share of each bank will depend on the use it makes of the 
competitive price and no price instruments at its disposal, as well as the use of these 
instruments by rival banks. The interest rates offered for deposits (
Dr ) and charged on 
loans (
Lr ) are considered as competitive price instruments and advertising expenses 
(ADV) and the number of branches (BR) are considered as no price competitive 
instruments.  
In the case of rival banks, the competitive price instrument is given as 
Drr  on 
deposit markets and as 
Lrr  on lending markets and the no price competitive instruments 
are given as ADVr for advertising and BRr for the number of branches. 
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For effects of empiric operation, Drr  and Lrr  are defined as the average interest 
rates on deposits and loans of all the banks in the sector, with the exception of the bank 
in question; BRr is defined as the difference between the total branches of the sector and 
the bank in question, and ADVr as the difference between the total advertising expenses 
of the sector and the expenses of the bank in question. 
It is assumed that no advertising goodwill exists, that is, given that the majority 
of advertisements used by the banks advertise products and rates with a short time span, 
one may consider that the effect of a given message goes out of date within the space of 
a year. Moreover, it is a fact that the popularity of brands depends on numerous other 
factors, which cannot be explained by advertising (e.g. the CGD, the best known bank, 
spent an almost insignificant amount on advertising during the period under analysis). 
If we admit that elasticity is constant, the equation relative to the potential 
market share for deposits is:  
 
tiBRrtiBRtiADVrtiADV
Dr
tir
D
tir
D
ti BRrBRADVrADVrrs DrD ,,,,,,0, lnlnlnlnlnlnln
*
       (2.7) 
 
Likewise, the equation relative to the potential lending market share can be 
described as: 
 
tiBRrtiBRtiADVrtiADV
Lr
tir
L
tir
L
ti BRrBRADVrADVrrs LrL ,,,,,,0, lnlnlnlnlnlnln
*
       (2.8) 
 
For simplicity’s sake, it is assumed that the banks have three types of assets: 
loans il , investment policies iS , and unremunerated reserves and, as liabilities, a 
determined amount of deposits id . The level of unremunerated reserves is a fraction 
 of the deposits. The equation for the bank’s balance will be iiii dlSd .  
It is considered that the banks are price-takers on the interbank monetary market. 
They apply the funds acquired at a rate of the interbank monetary market Sr , net from 
unremunerated reserves. The bank incurs three operational marginal costs: Dc  for 
each euro deposited, Lc  for each euro conceded in a loan and BRc  for each new 
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branch in operation. Marginal costs are taken as constant. The profit function of each 
individual bank will be: 
 
ti
BR
titti
DDSD
titti
LSLL
titi
BRcADVDcrrsLcrrs
,,,,,,,
)1(  (2.9) 
 
The approach taken in this study is similar to that developed in Clarke (1995), 
which in turn is a generalisation of the Dorfman and Steiner (1954) model. It turns out 
that each bank aims to maximise profit through the interest rate set for deposits and 
loans, the amount spent on advertising and the number of branches.  
In relation to the competitive price variables, the price conditions will be given 
as:  
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The optimum solution of the competitive price instruments is given by the 
following equations:  
 
ti
DDS
D
ti
Dr
ti
Dr
ti
D
ti
D
ti
D
tiDD
ti crr
rd
rd
r
s
r
s
r
,
,
,
,
*
,
,
*
,
, )1(
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
  (2.12) 
 
ti
LSL
L
ti
Lr
ti
Lr
ti
L
ti
L
ti
L
tiLL
ti crr
rd
rd
r
s
r
s
r ,
,
,
,
*
,
,
*
,
,
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
   (2.13) 
 
As in Clarke (1995), we shall use the term 
D
ti
Dr
ti
rd
rd
,
,
ln
ln
 of the equation (2.12) and 
the term 
L
ti
Lr
ti
rd
rd
,
,
ln
ln
 of the equation (2.13) for “elasticity of conjectural variations” of a 
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given bank in relation to its rivals, in the deposit interest rate and credit rate competitive 
instrument, respectively. These terms, which are also behaviour parameters, allow us to 
detect divergences in behaviour relative to a Nash situation, be it on deposit or lending 
markets. For a parameter value equal to zero, a Nash situation occurs, that is, each bank 
chooses its own interest rates regardless of the effects this decision will have on 
decisions taken by other institutions on the market. However, if the behaviour parameter 
value equals one, the banks coordinate their action in terms of interest rates, coming 
close to a cartel-like situation.  
For simplicity’s sake in our estimation, the effects of the elasticities of 
conjectural variations will be described as  rD  and rL  , that is, 
D
ti
Dr
tirD
rd
rd
,
,
ln
ln
 and 
L
ti
Lr
tirL
rd
rd
,
,
ln
ln
.   
 
For each bank, the elasticities understood from the competitive price instruments 
will be: 
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In turn, in reduced form, the optimum solution in terms of deposit and loan 
interest rates is given by the equations (2.16) and (2.17) respectively.  
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These equations can be equally presented so as to indicate deposit and loan 
price-cost margins, thus obtaining the expressions (2.18) and (2.19), respectively.  
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By clarifying the various components of perceived elasticities, we see that:  
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As inferred in the equations (2.18) and (2.20), the market power of each bank on 
the market, or rather, its capacity to create margins above those that would be applied in 
a situation of perfect competition depends negatively on the elasticity of demand 
perceived by the bank in relation to the deposit interest rate. The greater this elasticity, 
the more competitive will be the way in which the bank develops its activity in deposits.  
In turn, the elasticity of demand for deposit interest rates perceived by the bank 
incorporates various components, namely, the adjustment coefficient associated with the 
mobility of the deposit market share, demand-price elasticity, the parameter relative to 
 12 
sensitivity to the potential market share in relation to rival deposit interest rates and the 
behaviour parameter that reflects the level of coordination/coalition of the banks in the 
deposit interest rate instrument. Thus we understand the importance of the study of the 
relationships between the deposit margin created and the various components of the 
perceived elasticity of demand.  The contributing factors for a lesser perceived elasticity 
of deposit demand and, consequently, increased power over the market are: a reduced 
demand-price elasticity, high sensitivity of the bank’s potential market share to rival 
deposit interest rates, a high degree of coordination among banks and a reduced 
coefficient associated to the bank’s potential market share. 
Of course the deposit margin created will not depend directly on the values of 
the above-mentioned parameters, but rather on their joint effect. For example, if demand 
is very elastic, only by means of a high degree of collusion and/or low mobility of the 
deposit market will banks be able to create margins above the situation of perfect 
competition. Moreover, for low values in demand-price elasticity, a high margin may 
arise, even with limited collusion among banks and/or low mobility of the market share.  
Among the parameters determining perceived elasticity of deposit demand, 
special attention should be given to the parameter associated with the mobility of the 
market share. In a context of dynamic adjustment of market shares, the banks’ market 
power in deposits depends greatly on this parameter. We see that this interacts with the 
others. Demand-price elasticity, elasticity in relation to rivals and the parameter 
indicating the level of coordination among banks have an impact on the deposit margin 
which is always adjusted by the lambda coefficient. If the deposit market share is very 
low, the bank is far more capable of exercising its market power, independently of the 
elasticity of demand, elasticity in relation to rivals and the degree of coordination of the 
sector.  
As regards lending markets, the equations (2.19) and (2.21) show that market 
power is negatively related to the elasticity of demand perceived by the bank as far as 
loan interest rates are concerned. As was the case of deposit markets, we see that, the 
margin comes out as the opposite of the perceived elasticity of demand.  
The effects of the diverse components of the perceived elasticity of demand in 
relation to loan interest rates are, with the necessary adaptations, identical to those 
shown for deposits. Thus, the factors which contribute towards a lesser perceived 
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elasticity of demand in loans, which will affect whether the bank will have greater 
market power, are: a lesser demand-price elasticity, a high sensitivity of the potential 
market share to rival credit interest rates, a high level of coordination among banks and 
a reduced coefficient associated with the market share of the bank’s potential market. 
Once again one should emphasise the importance of the lambda coefficient in 
the expression of perceived elasticity. If the mobility of the lending market share is very 
low, the bank will achieve greater market power, even with high demand-price elasticity 
in relation to rival interest rates and a low degree of market collusion. 
As for the competitive no price variables, namely, advertising expenses and the 
number of branches, the prime conditions are, respectively: 
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Developing the prime conditions, the following optimum solutions are obtained: 
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As was the case of competitive price instruments, the concept of “the elasticity 
of conjectural variations” must be applied to non price instruments. The terms which 
translate it, and will allow us to detect the degree of coordination/collusion among 
banks regarding advertising expenses and the number of branches, consist in the derived 
totals of equations (2.24) and (2.25), that is, in the expressions 
ti
ti
ADVd
ADVrd
,
,
ln
ln
 and 
ti
ti
BRd
BRrd
,
,
ln
ln
, respectively. Once again, for simplicity’s sake, 
we shall represent the “ elasticities of conjectural variations” by ADV  or BR , 
depending on whether advertising or the number of branches is being referred to.  
New perceived elasticities also result from equations (2.24) and (2.25): the 
perceived elasticities of advertising and the number of branches in relation to deposits 
and to loans.  
For the perceived elasticity of advertising, we shall have:  
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Then, for each bank, the perceived elasticity of branches in relation to loans, will 
be, respectively: 
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 Applying the market share equations (2.7) e (2.8), the above elasticities can be 
represented as: 
 
ADV
ADVrADV
DDADV
ti
/
,     (2.30) 
ADV
ADVrADV
LLADV
ti
/
,     (2.31) 
BR
BRRBR
DDBR
ti
/
,      (2.32) 
BR
BRRBR
LLBR
ti
/
,      (2.33) 
  
We are now in a position to rewrite the optimum solutions for advertising and 
the number of branches, and thus obtain:  
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From the configuration of the equation (2.34), relating to the characterisation of 
the bank’s advertising policy, we can establish that the amount spent on advertising in a 
given year depends positively on the perceived elasticity of advertising in relation to 
deposits and loans and the margins created by both. In turn, the factors that affect this 
perceived elasticity are: the degree of mobility of the market share; elasticity regarding 
advertising; the elasticity regarding rival advertising and the degree of coordination 
among banks as regards advertising expenses.  
As to the equation of the optimum level of the number of banks (equation 2.35), 
the principal difference in relation to the equation of the optimum level of advertising 
has to do with the presence of the marginal cost of the branches. Also the decision to 
open new branches is based on the perceived elasticity of the number of branches in 
relation to deposits and loans and in the bank’s margins on the same markets. 
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2.2. THE EMPIRIC MODEL 
 
To put the afore-mentioned theoretical empiric model into operation, this chapter 
presents a group of adjustments to the model. In relation to the dynamic equations for 
market shares previously presented, there are no adjustments to be made. Nevertheless, 
with reference to the equations resulting from the model for the maximisation of profit 
of a banking company, two aspects need to be developed: on the one hand, one should 
include a coefficient of partial adjustment in the branches equation and, on the other 
hand, the parameter “elasticity of conjectural variations” should be defined empirically.  
In relation to the first empiric specification, the reason underlying the use of a 
mechanism of partial adjustment in the branches equation is the existence of significant 
costs in opening up and closing down branches. The existence of these costs means that 
lending institutions react very slowly to variations in market conditions in the number of 
branches instrument. When a bank decides to open up a new branch, it has to confront 
the initial investment with the actual value of future cash flows. So a temporary 
reduction in bank margins does not imply closing down some branches, as future, 
positive cash flows will compensate for short-term losses. 
This mechanism of partial adjustment can be modelled as follows: 
 
1,
*
,1,, titititi BRBRBRBR     (2.36) 
 
In the model above, already applied in Cabral and Majure (1993) and Pinho 
(1995a, 2000), BR  translates the actual number of branches the bank has and *BR  
their desired value, obtained via the condition of optimality (2.35). The parameter  is 
the coefficient of partial adjustment. 
So, for empiric effects, the branches equation is transformed into the following 
equation: 
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We shall now make some considerations about the empiric specification of the 
“elasticity of conjectural variations” parameters. The parameters rD , rL , ADV  and 
BR  not only allow us to detect deviation of behaviour relating to a Nash situation, at 
the level of price and no price competitive instruments, but also enable us to determine 
the perceived elasticity of demand of those instruments, as was shown in the previous 
section. Consequently, the value for the parameter for the elasticity of conjectural 
variations is a fundamental indicator of each bank’s market power, in each period.  
The traditional explanatory variations of market power in a context of 
differentiated product are concentration and the market share. In Hannan (1991), these 
two variables are recognised to be positively related to market power, the former 
through a lower elasticity of demand and the latter, through the reduction of perceived 
elasticity resulting from the greater dimension of the bank. Also in Pinho (2000, 2001), 
these variables are used to explain market power. Thus we shall use these two variables 
in the present study. As a measure of concentration, we shall use the Herfindal index for 
deposits (HERFD) and credit (HERFL), to estimate rD or rL , respectively. To 
estimate the parameter , relative to no price competitive instruments, Herfindal’s 
index for branches (HERFBR) will be the variable representing concentration. As for 
the variable representing the market share, we chose to consider the control variable 
LARGE (= 1 for “banks with a market share above 5%”) in the estimation of the 
parameters rD and rL  and the variable branches’ market share BRs  in order to 
estimate the parameter  of the competitive no price instruments. It is assumed that, 
generally speaking, the dominant companies or those with a large market share have 
significant advantages over their customers, translated in terms of the margins applied 
to them.  
Similarly the control variable PUB (=1 for “public banks”) was considered, so as 
to detect whether the competitive behaviour of public banks differed from private 
banks. Aspects of ownership are frequently explored in literature, often concluding that 
professionally managed banks take a more aggressive approach than cooperative or 
public banks, where maximising profit is not the chief objective. In Portugal, Barros and 
Modesto’s study (1999) is a key reference, as it establishes that the public institution 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos is far less aggressive in its behaviour than most private banks.  
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We shall therefore adopt the following specification of behaviour parameters  
for the competitive variables: 
 
PUBLARGEHERFD PUBDLARGEDCRDD
rD
0    (2.38) 
PUBLARGEHERFL PUBLLARGELCRLL
rL
0    (2.39) 
 
PUBsHERFBR PUBADV
BR
SADVCRADVADV
ADV
0    (2.40) 
PUBsHERFBR PUBBR
BR
SBRCRBRBR
BR
0    (2.41) 
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3. ESTIMATES AND RESULTS  
 
3.1. THE DATA 
 
The data used to estimate the previously presented model consist of a set of 175 
observations obtained from a set of 24 banks operating on the Portuguese market, 
during the period 1988-1997. This sample represents more than 95% of the deposit and 
lending markets, including the major Portuguese banks. We should point out that the 
175 observations were taken from an initial sample of 203 observations, as only the 
observations of banks with a market share of deposits above 0,5% were selected. 
Through this procedure we were able to eliminate some of the “noise” in the data, 
caused by the observations of very small banks.  
The data for variables that are part of balance sheets and demonstrations of the 
banks’ results were obtained through the bulletins of the Portuguese Bank Association; 
information about branches was obtained from the same source and from the Bank of 
Portugal; and information about public spending came from the results of a market 
research institute called Sabatina. All variables expressed in monetary terms are at 
constant prices for 1995.  
As there was no data available on the interest rates of diverse deposits (current 
and investment accounts) and on the various loans of each individual bank, we decided 
to work with average annual interest rates for each bank. The interest rate of the 
interbank monetary market Sr  was calculated as the annual average of the monthly 
interest rates of the interbank market published by the Bank of Portugal.  
As regards the marginal costs of deposits Dc , loans Lc  and branches BRc , it 
was initially attempted to estimate costs using a flexible translog, following the 
methodology described in Pinho (1995b). However, the parameters resulting from this 
estimation turned out to be of little significance statistically, as well as producing 
numerous negative marginal costs. It was therefore decided to estimate the above-
mentioned marginal costs using a cost function of the type:  
ti
BR
ti
L
ti
D
ti BRclcdcCFCT ,,,,     (3.1) 
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In the equation, the variable tiCT ,  represents the total cost of bank i in the 
period t, defined as the sum of the costs of personnel, of other operational costs and of 
the annual amount of depreciation. CF  translates the banks’ fixed cost. The remaining 
variables of the function are already known and refer to the individual amount of 
deposits and loans and the number of branches of each bank.  
 By estimating the (3.1) function, the results in table 1 were obtained. 
 
Table 1 – Marginal cost estimates 
Parameter Estimate Std Error t Ratio 
CF 1 250 752.1 1.663 
Dc  0.00342046 0.00422 0.811 
Lc  0.00991146 0.00752 1.318 
BRc  132.4 17.44 7.589 
2R  0.883   
 
 
As the cost function estimates resulted in a high R
2
 and low t-ratios for the 
majority of the parameters, we can accept the existence of multicolinearity. However, 
given that the marginal costs have a purely instrumental character in the model and do 
not constitute the fundamental aspect of this study, we believe we can use that estimate. 
Furthermore, the function (3.1) does not aim to represent a costs function typical of the 
banks. Our aim is simply to assess, for a group of banks, how costs react to alterations 
in the product. In this context, equal marginal costs are obtained for all the banks.  
One of the reasons why different marginal costs are considered for all the banks 
is the assumption that scale economies exist in the banking sector. However, in Pinho’s 
study (1995b), it is established that scale economies are not typical of most institutions. 
In this study it is argued that “the existence of scale economies is verified for the cases 
in which expansion is not governed by an increase in the branch network. In the more 
frequent, remaining cases these scale economies disappear for most institutions, 
maintained only by smaller banks”.  
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As was mentioned in the introduction, the estimation process of the model will 
have two different approaches: in the first approach, commissions will not be 
considered in the calculation of deposit and loan margins while in the second approach, 
those commissions will be included.  
In the first approach, the descriptive data statistics, considering only the 175 
observations, figure in table 2. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics, excluding commissions 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
d  753 844 855 994 50 386 4 500 128 
l  462 055 509 019 19 465 2 751 146 
Ds  0.048 0.054 0.005 0.263 
Ls  0.046 0.051 0.003 0.315 
BRs  0.046 0.039 0.002 0.213 
Dr  0.090 0.027 0.040 0.170 
Drr  0.087 0.021 0.052 0.116 
Lr  0.162 0.050 0.077 0.251 
Lrr  0.166 0.049 0.091 0.229 
Sr  0.118 0.040 0.055 0.173 
ADV  270.5 287.4 0.073 1 577 
ADVr  5 833 2 296 1 479 9 711 
BR  150.1 124.0 3.000 535.0 
BRr  3 097 917.6 1 475 4 605 
HERFD  0.102 0.013 0.076 0.116 
HERFL  0.092 0.021 0.061 0.131 
HERFBR  0.073 0.016 0.038 0.094 
LARGE  0.257 0.438 0.000 1.000 
PUB  0.429 0.496 0.000 1.000 
Monetary values expressed in thousand PTE 
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3.2. THE ESTIMATION PROCESS AND RESULTS 
 
The initial objective of this study consisted in estimating the system of non 
linear equations described by the set of dynamic equations of the market share of 
deposits (2.5) and loans (2.6) and the equations of behaviour relative to the optimum 
solution in terms of the interest rates of deposits (2.16) and loans (2.16), of advertising 
expenses (2.34) and the number of branches (2.37). However, the estimation using the 
method of non linear least squares (LSQ) of the TSP package presented problems in the 
use, in reduced form, of equations (2.16) and (2.17). 
This being so, in the system of non linear equations to be estimated, instead of 
including the optimum solution of deposit and loan interest rates in a reduced form, the 
optimum solution was included in a structural form, resulting in the substitution of 
equations (2.16) and (2.17) by equations (2.12) and (2.13). This new system of 
equations is presented on the following two pages. The method applied was still that of 
non linear least squares.  
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Market share of deposits: 
 
D
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tiBRrtiBRtiADVrtiADV
Dr
tir
D
tir
DD
ti sBRrBRADVrADVrrs DrD 1,,,,,,,0, ln1lnlnlnlnlnlnln  (3.2) 
 
Deposit interest rate:   
ti
DDS
PUBDLARGEDCRDDrr
DD
ti crrPUBLARGEHERFDr DrD ,0,     (3.3) 
 
Market share of loans: 
 
L
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L
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Lr
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L
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LL
ti sBRrBRADVrADVrrs LrL 1,,,,,,,0, ln1lnlnlnlnlnlnln   (3.4) 
 
Loan interest rate: 
 ti
LSL
PUBLLARGELCRLLrr
LL
ti crrPUBLARGEHERFLr LrL ,0,     (3.5) 
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Advertising: 
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Branches:                  (3.7) 
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The six equations are estimated simultaneously for the following reason: not 
only do the equations for behaviour (3.3), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) result from the prime 
conditions of the same problem, which increases the possibility of positive covariance 
among its residues, but also these equations incorporate a set of parameters which result 
from the equations of market share (3.2) and (3.4). An obvious interaction is assumed 
between the price policies for bank products (deposit and loan interest rates) and their 
divulgation (advertising) and distribution (branches). This approach reveals the need to 
consider the diverse elements of marketing-mix of a product or service as mutually 
consistent. The results of the simultaneous estimation of the six equations appear in 
table 3 for the final model. 
  
Table 3 - Estimation of the 5 equations of the model (final results) –excluding commissions 
        
 
 
Parameter Estimate Std Error t Ratio Significance
a 
D  0.195 0.071 2.733 *** 
0
 4.469 1.823 2.451 ** 
Dr
 1.647 0.522 3.158 *** 
Drr
 -3.234 1.231 -2.627 *** 
BR
 0.748 0.099 7.535 *** 
BRr
 -1.904 0.406 -4.687 *** 
L  0.171 0.049 3.467 *** 
Lr
 -2.911 0.774 -3.762 *** 
Lrr
 2.418 0.710 3.405 *** 
BR
 0.675 0.090 7.528 *** 
BRr
 -1.521 0.084 -18.048 *** 
 -0.027 0.005 -5.012 *** 
a
 The significance level of the estimated parameters is represented by  * (95%), ** (98%) and *** 
(99%); number of degrees of freedom: 163. 
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Equation Pseudo
2R  
Market share of deposits 0.970 
Deposit interest rate 0.123 
Market share of loans 0.950 
Loan interest rate 0.482 
Branches 0.977 
Log Likelihood -116.2 
 
The results obtained allow us to reject the hypothesis of coordinated behaviour 
by the banks, at all levels considered in the analysis, namely in deposit markets, lending 
markets and the number of branches. As in the result of applying the Wald Test, it was 
concluded that all the parameters of elasticity of conjectural variations ( D , L e BR ) 
are zero (considering a confidence level of 95%). 
From the estimate of the same parameters, we cannot accept the hypothesis that 
market power depends on the level of concentration of that same market, on the bank’s 
dimension and type of ownership, both for deposits and loans and the branch network. 
The initial argument that the largest institutions have lower perceived elasticities of 
demand is not confirmed. The public banks did not reveal less competitive behaviour 
than the private banks, and thus are not able to exert greater power over the market.  
The results in table 3 confirm the low mobility of deposit and loan market 
shares. In the deposits, only 19,5 % of the market share is sensitive to the action of 
competitive instruments
4
, while in loans, this percentage is even lower, at 17,1%. The 
high coefficient associated with the share of the previous year could result in a degree of 
inertia among deposit and loan customers and/or significant switching costs. This aspect 
is particularly important as it conditions the action of the banks considerably in using 
the diverse competitive instruments. On the one hand, the widespread use of 
competitive price and no price instruments, which underlie, for example, very 
aggressive growth strategies, could turn out to be too expensive when compared with 
the results achieved in the short term and medium term. On the other hand, the possible 
existence of switching costs could be quite favourable for the bank’s marketing policy, 
                                               
4 In Pinho (1995a) this estimate was 11,9%. So we can say that there was an increase in the market share 
mobility on deposits in the last years. 
 28 
in so far as these costs will more easily lead to customer loyalty (even though these 
costs in themselves   may simply reflect the bank’s capacity to keep its customers). 
As well as the low mobility evidenced, in general terms, on deposit and lending 
markets, it should be stressed that this phenomenon is more accentuated on the lending 
market. This is due, among other reasons, to the time limits and the complexity of the 
contracts. Loan contracts are normally established for long time periods (in housing 
loans the contract bond may last 30 years) which give stability to the customer/bank 
relationship, time wise. Loan contracts are also more complex than deposit contracts, 
often involving real guarantees, insurance, etc., which increases the inconvenience of 
switching bank, compared with deposits. 
As for the effectiveness of competitive instruments, both in deposits and loans, 
the competitive price instrument comes out as most effective. Demand-price elasticity is 
above one on both markets, and actually approaches three on lending markets. By 
applying symmetry test t, as shown in table 8, the result was that the parameters 
associated with interest rates are symmetrical, even though this symmetry is more 
evident in loans. The impact of a unitary percentage variation of the bank’s lending 
interest rate on the market share is practically the same as a unitary percentage 
variation, to the opposite, of the loan interest rate of rivals. The reasoning is analogous 
for deposits.   
As to the importance of the branch network as a competitive no price instrument, 
the case is similar to that of deposit and lending markets. The market shares (deposits 
and loans) of each bank are far more sensitive to the number of branches of its rivals 
than its own number of branches. In fact, on both markets, elasticity in relation to the 
number of rival branches is higher than one (1.9 and 1.5, respectively), while elasticity 
in relation to the bank’s own number of branches reaches values of approximately 0.7. 
Having tested the symmetry of the branch parameters (see table 8), the null symmetry 
hypothesis was rejected, considering a confidence level of 98% and 99%, for deposit 
and lending markets, respectively. 
Even though we admit that advertising expenses influence the bank’s potential 
market share, it was impossible to validate this relationship because, as has been 
mentioned, all the advertising parameters were excluded from the analysis. 
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The value estimated for the adjustment parameter for the branch network
027.0  is somewhat surprising. This estimate differs, to a large degree, from the 
values found in Pinho (1995a, 2000). In these studies, even though low values were 
given for the parameter, they were always positive. In the present study we find an 
exogenous growth rate to each bank’s branch network. The number of branches in each 
year results from a growth policy defined for the branch network, consisting, in this 
case, of an average annual rate of 2.7%. It was not possible to validate the hypothesis of 
the model, according to which the number of branches in each year is a function of loan 
and deposit margins. Even though the number of branches affects the potential market 
share, the banks’ behaviour in the opening of new branches did not support the 
economic theory. There was a certain overbranching in the Portuguese banking sector, 
in that banks continued to open new branches every year, even when a reduction of 
margins was foreseen. It can therefore be concluded that banks ignore the effect of 
margins on the opening of new branches. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In order to study price and no price competition on Portuguese deposit and 
lending markets in the period 1988-1997, a system of simultaneous equations was 
estimated which included dynamic equations of the market share and the deduction of 
the prime conditions of a model of profit maximisation of banking companies. The 
principal objective of this study consisted in assessing the relative importance of three 
competitive instruments in determining the banks’ market shares, both in deposits and 
loans. The competitive instruments considered were deposit and loan interest rates, 
advertising expenses and the number of branches. 
As parallel objectives, we aimed to analyse the degree of 
“coordination/collusion” of the sector in these instruments as well as the market power 
exercised by the banks and the mobility shown on deposit and lending markets. Two 
approaches were developed for their estimation. In the first phase, a more restricted 
concept of margins was used, excluding bank commissions from the analysis and, in the 
second phase, commissions were included. The aim was to assess how far commissions 
influenced the results of the first phase. 
One of the principal conclusions of the study has to do with the fact that the 
decision regarding the amount of advertising expenses and the number of branches does 
not obey the model for maximisation of profit, either when applying a broader concept 
of margin or a more restricted concept, or without considering commissions. There was 
an increase in both the amount of advertising expenses and the branch network at the 
same time that there were narrower deposit and loan margins. The margins did not turn 
out to be an explanatory factor of advertising expenses and the number of branches. 
This affirmation, in relation to advertising, was due to the very poor results presented by 
the estimation when the advertising equation was included and, in relation to the 
branches, it resulted from the fact that the estimation of the adjustment coefficient 
associated with branches revealed a growth outside the branch network, independently 
of the margins. 
 The weak capacity of the competitive instruments to affect the banks’ market 
share was another important conclusion. The adjustment coefficient associated with the 
previous year’s deposit and lending market share was very high, which could indicate a 
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degree of inertia of deposit customers and/or significant switching costs. It was also 
established that there was lower mobility in loans, perhaps due to longer time frames 
and the greater complexity of loan contracts. The use of a broader concept of margin, 
including commissions, caused a decrease in loan mobility. 
As regards the competitive component of deposit and lending market shares, the 
greater efficiency of price competitive instruments should be noted. It was not possible 
to accept the hypothesis of anti-competitive behaviour by banking institutions, on all 
markets analysed. In the second approach of the model, only the public banks showed 
anti-competitive behaviour, but only on deposit markets. On lending markets the public 
banks are as competitive as the private banks. It was not possible to validate market 
power associated with the banks’ dimension and the degree of concentration of the 
market. 
 The results achieved by this study could be a contribution to the process of 
strategic decision-making of a bank. The reduced mobility shown in deposits and loans 
could allow managers to explore more fully the benefits of Customer Relationship 
Management tools. We may be in the presence of a banking sector with high switching 
costs, which to some extent translates the effort made to keep customers. In this context, 
managers should continue to use customer-based systems. 
Investment in traditional competitive instruments could turn out to be 
unprofitable, especially in the short or the medium term. However, if the aim is to use 
these instruments, then managers should pay particular attention to price instruments, 
particularly the competitive value of commissions. The phenomenon of overbranching 
appears to have contributed to a reduction in the competitive importance of branches, 
over the past years. Generally speaking, managers should avoid a branch growth 
strategy. Finally, one should bear in mind that advertising is not a factor capable of 
significantly influencing the market share and therefore prudence is recommended in 
the use of this instrument.  
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